






































































UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 




ROBINHOOD FINANCIAL LLC, et al., 
Defendants. 
 
Case No.  21-cv-01013-SVK    
 
 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS 




Defendants Robinhood Financial LLC and Robinhood Securities, LLC (“Defendants” or 
“Robinhood”) move to dismiss Plaintiffs Siddharth Mehta (“Mehta”), Kevin Qian (“Qian”), and 
Michael Furtado’s (“Furtado”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) First Amended Class Action Complaint 
(“FAC”) (Dkt. 10) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted and Rule 9(b) on the grounds that Plaintiffs fail to plead some 
claims with the particularity required by Rule 9(b).  Dkt. 15.  The Parties have consented to the 
jurisdiction of a magistrate judge.  Dkts. 9, 14. 
The Court held a hearing on April 27, 2021.  Dkt. 29.  After considering the Parties’ 
submissions, arguments at the hearing, the case file and relevant law, the Court GRANTS IN 
PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion to dismiss the FAC for the reasons 
discussed below. 
II. BACKGROUND 
This discussion of the background facts is based on the allegations of Plaintiffs’ FAC.  
Plaintiffs allege that Robinhood failed to keep their promise to maintain the highest security 
standards.  Dkt. 10 ¶ 15.  As a result, in the summer and fall of 2020, and perhaps even earlier, 





































































unauthorized users accessed approximately 2,000 Robinhood customers’ accounts containing the 
customers’ sensitive personal and financial information and looted their funds.  Id. ¶¶ 4, 18.  
Plaintiffs allege that Robinhood does not offer a phone number for customer service, forcing 
customers to attempt to contact Robinhood by email.  Id. ¶¶ 4, 21.  Robinhood customers were left 
waiting for days or weeks while their account funds were depleted.  Id. ¶¶ 4, 21.  Plaintiffs further 
allege that Robinhood failed to freeze the affected accounts or alert their customers of the breach 
right away and did nothing until news outlets reported on the breach.  Id. ¶¶ 5, 20.  After the 
security breaches were widely reported, Robinhood sent push notifications to customers 
encouraging them to enable two-factor authentication.  Id. ¶ 20.   Plaintiffs allege that many 
individuals who were affected by the breach already had two-factor identification enabled when 
the unauthorized access occurred.  Id.  Collectively, Robinhood customers lost millions of dollars 
and have spent substantial amounts of their time attempting to remedy the losses and prevent 
further losses.  Id. ¶¶ 18, 22, 23.  Plaintiffs allege that while Robinhood promised it would cover 
100 percent of any losses due to unauthorized activity, Robinhood has only compensated some 
individuals while refusing other individual’s requests.  Id. ¶¶ 6, 22. 
Plaintiff Mehta held an investment account with Robinhood and was a purchaser of their 
services in 2020.  Id. ¶ 27.  As early as July 22, 2020, or possibly sooner, there was unauthorized 
access to Mehta’s personal and financial information, funds Mehta had deposited into a 
Robinhood account, and control of securities positions Mehta purchased through Robinhood.  Id.  
As a result of Robinhood’s negligent and illegal conduct, Mehta lost tens of thousands of dollars 
and “spent hours of his own time attempting to research and remedy the loss and securing his 
other assets and information from further breach.”  Id.  Robinhood did not inform Mehta of this 
breach and only acknowledged the breach after Mehta confronted Robinhood about the loss of 
funds 85 days after the initial breach occurred.  Id. 
Similarly, Plaintiff Qian held an investment account with Robinhood and was a purchaser 
of their services in 2020.  Id. ¶ 28.  As early as October 10, 2020, and possibly sooner, there was 
unauthorized access to Qian’s personal and financial information, access to funds he had deposited 
into a Robinhood account, and control of securities positions he had purchased through 





































































Robinhood.  Id.  Plaintiffs allege that Robinhood neglected to inform him of this breach and only 
acknowledged the breach after Qian confronted Robinhood about the loss days after the initial 
breach.  Id.  As a result, Qian has also lost tens of thousands of dollars and spent hours of his own 
time attempting to research and remedy the loss and protect his assets and information from 
further breach.  Id.   
Plaintiff Furtado held an investment account with Robinhood and was a purchaser of their 
services in 2021.  Id. ¶ 29.  As early as February 12, 2021 and possibly sooner, there was 
unauthorized access to Furtado’s personal and financial information, access to the funds he had 
deposited into a Robinhood account, and control of securities positions Furtado purchased through 
Robinhood.  Id.  Furtado attempted to contact Robinhood by email, because Robinhood does not 
provide a customer service phone number.  Id.  However, he did not receive a response regarding 
the breach for thirteen days.  Id.  As a result, Furtado lost over ten thousand dollars, purchased 
identity theft protection services, and has spent time attempting to research and remedy the loss 
and protect his assets and information from further breach.  Id.  
Plaintiffs bring this action to seek monetary and equitable relief as a class action on behalf 
of themselves and the following classes:  
 
Class: All Robinhood customers whose accounts were accessed by 
unauthorized users from January 1, 2020 to the present. 
 
Reimbursement Subclass: All Class members who suffered direct 
losses due to unauthorized activity and were not compensated in full 
by Robinhood for said losses. 
 
California Subclass: All Class members who were California 
residents. 
Id. ¶¶ 34-36.   
III. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE AND INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE 
A. Legal Standard 
There are two doctrines that allow district courts to consider material outside the pleadings 
without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment: judicial notice under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 201 and incorporation by reference.  Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, 





































































Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 998 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. Hagan v. Khoja, — U.S. —, 139 S. 
Ct. 2615, 204 L. Ed. 2d 264 (2019).  “The court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to 
reasonable dispute.”  Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).  A fact is “not subject to reasonable dispute” if it “is 
generally known” or “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy 
cannot reasonably be questioned.”  Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(1)-(2).  However, “[j]ust because the 
document itself is susceptible to judicial notice does not mean that every assertion of fact within 
that document is judicially noticeable for its truth.”  Khoja, 899 F.3d at 999. 
Incorporation by reference is a judicially created doctrine that allows a court to consider 
certain documents as though they are part of the complaint itself.  Khoja, 899 F.3d at 1002.  “The 
doctrine prevents plaintiffs from selecting only portions of documents that support their claims, 
while omitting portions of those very documents that weaken—or doom—their claims.”  Id.  A 
defendant can seek to incorporate a document into the complaint “if the plaintiff refers extensively 
to the document or the document forms the basis of the plaintiff’s claim.”  U.S. v. Ritchie, 342 
F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).  While the “mere mention” of the existence of a 
document is insufficient to incorporate a document, it is proper to incorporate a document if the 
claim “necessarily depended” on them.  Khoja, 899 F.3d at 1002. 
After a defendant offers such a document, the district court can treat the document as part 
of the complaint, and “thus may assume that its contents are true for purposes of a motion to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).”  Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 908.  However, “[w]hile this is generally true, 
it is improper to assume the truth of an incorporated document if such assumptions only serve to 
dispute facts stated in a well-pleaded complaint.”  Khoja, 899 F.3d at 1003.  Indeed, using 
extrinsic documents to “resolve competing theories against the complaint risks premature 
dismissals of plausible claims that may turn out to be valid after discovery” and it is “improper to 
do so only to resolve factual disputes against the plaintiff’s well-pled allegations in the 
complaint.”  Id. at 998, 1014. 
B. Analysis 
Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice of or incorporate by reference the 
following documents:  






































































(1) Robinhood’s publicly available webpage titled “Our 6 
commitments to you,” including archived versions of the 
webpage throughout the alleged class period (Dkt. 15-2 Ex. 
1); 
 
(2) Robinhood’s July 24, 2019 e-mails entitled “Protecting your 
information” (Dkt. 15-3 Ex. 2); 
 
(3) Robinhood’s October 9-13, 2020 “Inbox Message” advising 
customers to “Enable Two-Factor Authentication” (Dkt. 15-4 
Ex. 3); 
 
(4) Robinhood’s October 9-13, 2020 “Push Notification” 
advising customers to “Enable Two-Factor Authentication to 
add another layer of protection to your account” (Dkt. 15-5 
Ex. 4);  
 
(5) Robinhood’s October 21-23, 2020 “Enable 2FA” follow up 
campaign e-mail reminding customers to enable 2FA (Dkt. 
15-6 Ex. 5); and 
 
(6) Robinhood’s October 28-29, 2020 2FA application “Card” 
advising customers to “Add an extra layer of protection to 
your account. Enable 2FA now” (Dkt. 15-7 Ex. 6). 
Dkt. 16. 
Plaintiffs ask the Court to take judicial notice of or incorporate by reference the following 
documents:  
 
(1) Bloomberg news article, “Robinhood Users Say Accounts 
Were Looted, No One to Call,” dated October 9, 2020 (Dkt. 
20-1 Ex. 1);  
 
(2) Bloomberg news article, “Robinhood Internal Probe Finds 
Hackers Hit Almost 2,000 Accounts,” dated October 15, 2020 
(Dkt. 20-2 Ex. 2);  
 
(3) Bloomberg news article, “Digital Thieves Are Hacking 
Brokerage Accounts: Is Your Money Safe?” dated October 
13, 2020 (updated October 15, 2020) (Dkt. 20-3 Ex. 3); 
 
(4) Robinhood Customer Agreement from April 28, 2020 (Dkt. 
20-4 Ex. 4); and 
 









































































As stated on the record at the hearing, the Court rules as follows:  
 
Document Ruling 
Defendants’ Exhibit 1 (Dkt. 15-2) Request for judicial notice is GRANTED without any 
commentary or markings added to the document. Request 
to incorporate by reference is DENIED. 
Defendants’ Exhibit 2 (Dkt. 15-3) Request for judicial notice and request to incorporate by 
reference are DENIED AS MOOT. 
Defendants’ Exhibit 3 (Dkt. 15-4) Request for judicial notice is GRANTED.  Request to 
incorporate by reference is DENIED. 
Defendants’ Exhibit 4 (Dkt. 15-5) Request for judicial notice and request to incorporate by 
reference are DENIED. 
Defendants’ Exhibit 5 (Dkt. 15-6) Request for judicial notice is GRANTED. Request to 
incorporate by reference is DENIED. 
Defendants’ Exhibit 6 (Dkt. 15-7) Request for judicial notice and request to incorporate by 
reference are DENIED. 
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 1 (Dkt. 20-1) Request for judicial notice is GRANTED. Request to 
incorporate by reference is DENIED. 
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 2 (Dkt. 20-2) Request for judicial notice is GRANTED. Request to 
incorporate by reference is DENIED. 
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 3 (Dkt. 20-3) Request for judicial notice is GRANTED. Request to 
incorporate by reference is DENIED. 
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 4 (Dkt. 20-4) Request for judicial notice is GRANTED. Request to 
incorporate by reference is DENIED. 
Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 5 (Dkt. 20-5) Request for judicial notice is GRANTED. Request to 
incorporate by reference is DENIED. 





































































IV. MOTION TO DISMISS 
A. Legal Standard 
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted.  In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court may consider only 
“the complaint, materials incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which the 
court may take judicial notice.”  Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 
1061 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).  In deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a claim, the 
court must assume the plaintiff’s allegations are true and draw all reasonable inferences in the 
plaintiff’s favor.  Usher v. City of L.A., 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987).  However, the court is 
not required to accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of 
fact, or unreasonable inferences.”  In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 
2008) (citation omitted). 
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the plaintiff must allege “enough facts 
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).  This “facial plausibility” standard requires the 
plaintiff to allege facts that add up to “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 
unlawfully.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). 
Courts should freely give leave to amend unless the district court determines that it is clear 
that the complaint’s deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment.  Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 
245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995).  When amendment would be futile, the court may dismiss without leave 
to amend.  Dumas v. Kipp, 90 F.3d 386, 393 (9th Cir. 1996). 
B. Analysis 
Plaintiffs allege that due to Robinhood’s failure to maintain proper industry-standard 
security measures, customers were needlessly exposed to the risk of data and identity theft.  Dkt. 
10 ¶¶ 16, 17.  As a result of Robinhood’s security measures, unauthorized third parties accessed 
approximately 2,000 customers’ personal and financial information, customers’ funds, and control 
over securities positions customers purchased through Robinhood.  Id. ¶ 18.   Plaintiffs allege that 
Robinhood “has repeatedly neglected to fully inform customers regarding the nature and scope of 





































































security failures and unauthorized activity.”  Id. ¶ 20.  Further, “[c]ontrary to Robinhood’s 
‘commitment’ to cover losses caused by unauthorized use, Robinhood has failed to compensate 
millions of dollars of losses claimed by those affected by the breach.”  Id. ¶ 22.  From these 
allegations, Plaintiffs assert eight claims: (1) negligence; (2) breach of contract; (3) violation of 
the California Consumer Privacy Act; (4) violation of the Customer Records Act; (5) violation of 
the Consumers Legal Remedies Act; (6) violation of the right to privacy; (7) violation of the 
Unfair Competition Law; and (8) violation of the False Advertising Law.   
Defendants assert an overarching argument that Robinhood’s computer network did not 
suffer a data breach and Plaintiffs fail to adequately plead that Robinhood maintained inadequate 
security measures.  Defendants also assert arguments as to why each claim individually should be 
dismissed. 
1. Unauthorized Access 
Defendants first argue that Plaintiffs fail to allege a breach of Robinhood’s network and 
that Plaintiffs cannot do so, because there was no such breach.  Dkt. 15 at 16.  Defendants contend 
that “third parties were able to access customer accounts by identity theft originating outside the 
Robinhood system.”  Id. at 16-17 (citing Dkt. 10 ¶ 20) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Defendants further argue that “Plaintiffs plead no facts tying any account takeovers to 
Robinhood’s security measures.”  Id. at 17.  Without such allegations, Plaintiffs’ FAC is “too 
conclusory and must be dismissed.”  Id.  Defendants further argue that Robinhood has more than 
13 million customers and that the number of alleged takeovers is no more than .01 percent of their 
customers.  Dkt. 22 at 6. 
In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the FAC does allege that Robinhood used inadequate 
data security.  Dkt. 17 at 11.  Plaintiffs contend that alleging that thousands of customer accounts 
accessed by unauthorized users in a matter of days is “more than enough for a reasonable 
inference of a breach of a computer system in a data security case.”  Id.   
The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ factual allegations are sufficient to support their claims at 
the pleading stage.  Plaintiffs allege that Robinhood “does not keep its promise to maintain the 
highest security standards” and “[i]ts system lacks simple and almost universal security measures” 





































































that could “prevent unauthorized users from transferring customer funds from an account without 
substantial verification.”  Dkt. 10 ¶ 15.  Plaintiffs allege that as a result, Robinhood “negligently 
and illegally allowed unauthorized third-party access to approximately 2,000 customers’ personal 
and financial information.”  Id. ¶ 18.  Thus, at this stage of the proceedings, Plaintiffs’ allegations 
that unauthorized third parties were able to access approximately 2,000 Robinhood customers’ 
accounts and deplete their funds due to Robinhood’s security measures are sufficient.  Usher, 828 
F.2d at 561 (“On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must presume all factual 
allegations of the complaint to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
nonmoving party.”) (citation omitted).  Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have 
adequately alleged that a breach occurred. 
2. Negligence Claim 
a. Economic Loss Doctrine 
Defendants argue that the economic loss rule bars Plaintiffs from recovering for any 
alleged account losses in tort.  Dkt. 15 at 23.  Defendants further argue that the exception to the 
economic loss rule where a special relationship exists between the parties does not apply here.  Id. 
at 24.  At the hearing, Defendants acknowledged that there were non-economic losses alleged, but 
argues that they were too vague and speculative to be redressable. 
“Quite simply, the economic loss rule prevents the law of contract and the law of tort from 
dissolving one into the other.”  Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp., 34 Cal.4th 979, 988, 
22 Cal.Rptr.3d 352, 102 P.3d 268, 273 (2004).  “Under the economic loss rule, purely economic 
losses are not recoverable in tort.”  R Power Biofuels, LLC v. Chemex LLC, No. 16-CV-00716-
LHK, 2016 WL 6663002, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 11, 2016) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  If Plaintiffs’ harms were purely economic, the Court would then be required to reach the 
question of whether any exception, such as a “special relationship,” exists.  Flores-Mendez v. 
Zoosk, Inc., No. C 20-04929 WHA, 2021 WL 308543, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2021) (citing 
J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal.3d 799, 804 (1979) (discussing the six-factor test for special 
relationship that can overcome the economic loss doctrine)). 
Plaintiffs allege that their harms and losses include “the loss of control over the use of their 





































































identity, harm to their constitutional right to privacy, lost time dedicated to the investigation of and 
attempt to recover the loss of funds and cure harm to their privacy, the need for future [] time 
dedicated to the recovery and protection of further loss, and privacy injuries associated with 
having their sensitive personal and financial information disclosed.”  Dkt. 10 ¶ 48; see Flores-
Mendez, 2021 WL 308543, at *3 (determining that plaintiffs do not allege pure economic loss 
because they allege “loss of time, risk of embarrassment, and enlarged risk of identity theft”); Bass 
v. Facebook, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1039 (“Here, plaintiff alleged his loss of time as a harm 
and so does not allege pure economic loss.”); see also In re Solara Medical Supplies, LLC 
Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, No. 3:19-cv-2284-H-KSC, 2020 
WL 2214152, at *4 (S.D. Cal. May 7, 2020) (finding that plaintiffs do not allege pure economic 
loss because they alleged that they “lost time responding to the Breach as well as suffering from 
increased anxiety”); but see Gardiner v. Walmart Inc., No. 20-cv-04618-JSW, 2021 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 75079, at *24 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2021) (finding that “[p]laintiff’s allegations about the 
value of his lost time constitutes economic loss”).   
Based upon the allegations in the FAC, the Court finds that Plaintiffs do not allege solely 
economic loss.  See, e.g., Dkt. 10 ¶ 48 (alleging that Defendants’ actions “caus[ed] [Plaintiffs] 
harms and losses including but not limited to [] the loss of control over the use of their identity, 
harm to their constitutional right to privacy, lost time dedicated to the investigation of and attempt 
to recover the loss of funds and cure harm to their privacy, the need for future [] time dedicated to 
the recovery and protection of further loss, and privacy injuries associated with having their 
sensitive personal and financial information disclosed”).  Accordingly, the Court need not address 
whether a special relationship exists and turns to the elements of a negligence claim.  
b. Negligence 
To state a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must plead a duty, a breach of duty, proximate 
cause, and damages.  See Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 572 (9th Cir. 2009).   
Defendants argue that the FAC fails to adequately allege any breach of a general duty of 
care.  Dkt. 15 at 34.  Plaintiffs contend that Robinhood owed a duty to Plaintiffs because it was the 
custodian of their highly sensitive personal and financial information.  Dkt. 17 at 13.  The Court 





































































agrees with Plaintiffs.  Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Defendants owed a duty of 
reasonable care to Plaintiffs.  Dkt. 10 ¶ 45 (alleging that “Defendants owed a duty of reasonable 
care . . . based upon Defendants’ contractual obligations, custom and practice, right to control 
information and funds in its possession, exercise of control over the information and funds in its 
possession, authority to control the information and funds in its possession, and the commission of 
affirmative acts that resulted in said harms and losses”); see Flores-Mendez, 2021 WL 308543, at 
*4 (determining that plaintiffs have adequately alleged a duty of care); see also Stasi v. Immediata 
Health Group Corp., --- F. Supp. 3d ----, No. 19cv2353 JM (LL), 2020 WL 6799437, at *7 (S.D. 
Cal. Nov. 19, 2020) (citing cases that found that defendants had a duty to safeguard personal 
information and maintain adequate security measures). 
Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants breached their duty of care in their manner of 
collecting, maintaining, and controlling their customers’ sensitive personal and financial 
information.  Dkt. 10 ¶ 46.  Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that Defendants breached this duty by 
“stor[ing] customers’ information in an unsecure format (¶ 16), fail[ing] to require multi-factor 
authentication at login (¶ 20), allow[ing] unauthorized users to link bank accounts to customer 
accounts without verification (¶ 15), and otherwise implement[ing] lax security practices that 
allowed unauthorized access to Plaintiffs’ accounts (¶¶ 17, 46).”  Dkt. 17 at 12-13.  In Flores-
Mendez, the Court reasoned that “[t]he consuming public has come to believe that internet 
companies, which take in their private information, have taken adequate security steps to protect 
the security of that information from any and all hackers or interventions.”  2021 WL 308543, at 
*4 (“The breach would not have occurred but for inadequate security measures, or so it can be 
reasonably inferred at the pleadings stage.”). 
Third, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged proximate cause, alleging that “unauthorized 
users gained access to, exfiltrated, stole, and gained disclosure of the sensitive personal and 
financial information of Plaintiffs and the Class, access to the funds customers had deposited into 
their accounts, and control over securities positions customers purchased.”  Dkt. 10 ¶ 48.   
As to damages, Plaintiffs adequately allege damages, including “the loss of control over 
the use of their identity, harm to their constitutional right to privacy, lost time dedicated to the 





































































investigation of and attempt to recover the loss of funds and cure harm to their privacy, the need 
for future [] time dedicated to the recovery and protection of further loss, and privacy injuries 
associated with having their sensitive personal and financial information disclosed.”  Id.; see 
Flores-Mendez, 2021 WL 308543, at *4. 
c. Negligence Per Se 
Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants “committed per se breaches of said duty by 
negligently violating the dictates of California Civil Code sections 1798.82, et seq., and 1798.100, 
et seq., and the provisions of the California Constitution enshrining the right to privacy.”  Dkt. 10 
¶ 47.  “In California, there are four elements required to establish a viable negligence per se 
theory: (1) the defendant violated a statute or regulation; (2) the violation caused the plaintiff’s 
injury; (3) the injury resulted from the kind of occurrence the statute or regulation was designed to 
prevent; and (4) the plaintiff was a member of the class of persons the statute or regulation was 
intended to protect.”  Carson v. Depuy Spine Inc., 365 F. App’x. 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2010).  
“District courts have relied on allegations of negligence per se to deny Rule 12(b)(6) motions to 
dismiss.”  Stasi, 2020 WL 6799437, at *12.   
As discussed below, Plaintiffs plead a plausible violation of the California Consumer 
Privacy Act (Section IV.B.4) and their constitutional right to privacy (Section IV.B.7).  It is 
reasonable at this stage in the litigation to determine that Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries are the injuries 
the California Consumer Privacy Act and constitutional right to privacy were intended to prevent 
and that Plaintiffs are members of the class of persons the California Consumer Privacy Act and 
constitutional right to privacy were intended to protect.   
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ 
negligence claim is DENIED. 
3. Breach of Contract Claim 
To plead a claim for breach of contract, Plaintiffs must allege: “(1) the existence of a 
contract with Defendants, (2) their performance under that contract, (3) Defendants breached that 
contract, and (4) they suffered damages.”  In re Google Assistant Privacy Litig., 457 F. Supp. 3d 
797, 831 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (citation omitted). 





































































Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim fails because Plaintiffs’ 
allegation that Robinhood promised to reimburse customers for account losses due to unauthorized 
activity is not enforceable.  Dkt. 15 at 18.  Defendants argue that this statement was made only 
after Plaintiffs opened their Robinhood accounts and after Plaintiffs Mehta’s and Qian’s accounts 
were taken over.  Id. at 18-19.  Further, Defendants contend that the statements that Robinhood is 
“[d]edicated to maintaining the highest security standards” and that “we take privacy and security 
seriously” are “not the kind of sufficiently definite promise that can support any legal claim.”  Id. 
at 19-21.  Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs’ injuries are not recoverable under a breach of 
contract claim because unauthorized collection of personal information does not create an 
economic loss and “[n]ominal damages, speculative harm, or threat of future harm do not suffice 
to show legally cognizable injury.”  Id. at 26 (quoting In re Solara, 2020 WL 2214152, at *5) 
(citation omitted). 
Plaintiffs contend that a Robinhood spokesperson stated that “[i]f we determine that our 
investigation that the customer has sustained losses because of unauthorized activity, we will 
compensate the customer fully for those losses.”  Dkt. 17 at 20 (citing Dkt. 20-3 Ex. 3).  Further, 
Plaintiffs contend that the December 30, 2020 Robinhood Customer Agreement, which is attached 
to the FAC as Exhibit 2, states that Robinhood “will correct any error promptly.”  Dkt. 17 at 20.  
Plaintiffs argue that this same representation was also made in the April 28, 2020 version of the 
Robinhood Customer Agreement, prior to the alleged unauthorized access of Mehta’s and Qian’s 
accounts, although this document is not referenced in the FAC.  Id.  They contend that this 
statement would “presumably [] include unauthorized transfers.”  Id.  Plaintiffs also reference, in 
their opposition but not in the FAC, the Robinhood Financial Privacy Notice, arguing that this 
document also contains actionable promises.  Id. at 21 (citing Dkt. 20-5 Ex. 5).  Finally, Plaintiffs 
contend that they plead appreciable and actual damage, as well as future economic loss.  Dkt. 17 at 
26. 
Plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege a breach of contract claim.  First, the version of the 
Robinhood Customer Agreement attached to the FAC is not the Customer Agreement that was 
effective at the time of the alleged breach of Plaintiffs Mehta’s and Qian’s accounts.  See Dkt. 10 ¶ 





































































50.  Similarly, while Plaintiffs reference the Bloomberg statement and Financial Privacy Notice in 
their opposition for the assertion that these documents also show actionable promises, there is no 
specific reference to these documents in the FAC.  See Dkt. 17 at 21.  Plaintiffs have not met their 
burden of pleading the basis of their breach of contract claim.  Accordingly, Defendants’ motion 
to dismiss Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim is GRANTED.  
4. California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”) Claim 
The CCPA permits “[a]ny consumer whose nonencrypted and nonredacted personal 
information . . . is subject to an unauthorized access and exfiltration, theft, or disclosure as a result 
of the business’s violation of the duty to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures 
and practices appropriate to the nature of the information to protect the personal information may 
institute a civil action.”  Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.150(a)(1).  Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ CCPA 
claim fails because Plaintiffs cannot allege any qualifying unauthorized disclosure or that any such 
disclosure was the result of a violation of “the duty to implement and maintain reasonable and 
appropriate security procedures and practices.”  Dkt. 15 at 27.  Defendants further contend that 
CCPA’s private right of action provision applies only to an unauthorized access of personal 
information from Robinhood’s network, rather than independent third-party breaches of Plaintiffs’ 
individual accounts.  Id. at 28.  Defendants also contend that Plaintiffs did not allege theft or 
disclosure of each required data element.  Id. at 27.  On the other hand, Plaintiffs contend that the 
California Legislature “intended for a broad range of activity or inactivity to constitute violations 
of the CCPA.”  Dkt. 17 at 15.  Further, Plaintiffs contend that courts have defined “disclosure” 
under CCPA to include circumstances when personal information is accessible through the 
internet by unauthorized persons.  Id. at 14 (citing Stasi, 2020 WL 6799437, at *16). 
The Court previously determined that Plaintiffs plausibly allege that a breach occurred.  
See Section IV.B.1.  The Court finds Stasi instructive, where the parties determined that 
allegations that plaintiffs’ personal and medical information were accessible via the internet 
constitute a “disclosure” under the CCPA.  Stasi, 2020 WL 6799437, at *16.  Defendants have not 
met their burden of showing otherwise.  Plaintiffs allege that Robinhood has customers’ “sensitive 
personal and financial information, including but not limited to their names, social security 





































































numbers, dates of birth, mailing addresses, telephone numbers, bank account numbers, details of 
their income, bank account balances, financial transaction histories, credit histories, tax 
information, and credit scores” as well as “cell phone and mobile computing device location data, 
IP addresses, and Wi-Fi network data.”  Dkt. 10 ¶¶ 12-13.  Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants 
violated their duty to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures by “allow[ing] 
unauthorized users to view, use, manipulate, exfiltrate, and steal the nonencrypted and 
nonredacted personal information of Plaintiffs and other customers, including their personal and 
financial information.”  Id. ¶ 58.  At the pleadings stage, Plaintiffs sufficiently allege a plausible 
claim that their personal and financial information was subject to an unauthorized access based on 
violation of the CCPA.  Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ CCPA claim is 
DENIED. 
5. Customer Records Act (“CRA”) Claim 
The CRA states that “[a] person or business that conducts business in California, and that 
owns or licenses computerized data that includes personal information, shall disclose a breach of 
the security of the system following discovery or notification of the breach in the security of the 
data to a resident of California . . . whose unencrypted personal information was, or is reasonably 
believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person . . . in the most expedient time possible 
and without unreasonable delay.”  Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.82(a).  Similar to the CCPA claim, 
Defendants contend that this claim fails without any allegation of any unauthorized access to 
Robinhood’s computer network.  Dkt. 15 at 12, 29; Dkt. 22 at 15.  Further, Defendants argue that 
Plaintiffs fail to allege when Robinhood first learned of any incident for which it should have 
notified Plaintiffs sooner.  Dkt. 15 at 30; Dkt. 22 at 15.  Plaintiffs contend that “the Court can 
reasonably infer that Robinhood suffered a ‘breach of the security system’ for the purposes of the 
CRA” from the FAC.  Dkt. 17 at 16.  While not addressed in the opposition, Plaintiffs argued at 
the hearing that they allege in the FAC that Robinhood only disclosed the security breach after 
reports were leaked by anonymous sources to news outlets (Dkt. 10 ¶ 20) and that thousands of 
Robinhood customers attempted to contact Robinhood by email (Id. ¶ 4).  Plaintiffs also 
acknowledged at the hearing that this claim can be amended. 





































































As stated above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs plausibly allege a breach.  See Section 
IV.B.1.  However, the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged 
when Robinhood actually discovered that the unauthorized access took place.  See In re Yahoo! 
Inc. Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, 313 F. Supp. 3d 1113, 1146 (N.D. Cal. 2018) 
(dismissing plaintiffs’ CRA claim because plaintiffs failed to allege anything suggesting when 
defendants learned of the breach, which is necessary to determine whether there was unreasonable 
delay).  Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ CRA claim is GRANTED. 
6. Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”) Claim 
The CLRA prohibits “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices.”  Cal. Civ. Code § 1770.  To state a claim under CLRA, a plaintiff must allege: “(1) a 
misrepresentation; (2) reliance on that misrepresentation; and (3) damages caused by that 
misrepresentation.”  In re Sony PS3 Other OS Litigation, 551 F. App’x 916, 920 (9th Cir. 2014).  
“CLRA claims are governed by the ‘reasonable consumer’ test, under which a plaintiff must allege 
that ‘members of the public are likely to be deceived.’”  Id.  (quoting Williams v. Gerber Prods. 
Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir.2008)). 
First, Defendants contend that this claim is subject to the heightened pleading requirements 
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), and Plaintiffs fail to adequately allege any enforceable 
promise.  Dkt. 15 at 16, 18-22.  Defendants contend that the statement “to fully reimburse direct 
losses that happen due to unauthorized activity that is not your fault” was never made before the 
alleged third-party takeovers of Plaintiffs Mehta’s and Qian’s accounts.  Id. at 11, 19-20.  
Additionally, Defendants contend that the statements made regarding Robinhood’s security 
commitments such as “tak[ing] privacy and security seriously” and that Robinhood is “[d]edicated 
to maintaining the highest security standards” are “non-actionable puffery.”  Id. at 21-22 (citing In 
re Yahoo! Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 16-MD-02752-LHK, 2017 WL 3727318, at 
*26 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2017).  Specifically, Defendants argue that these statements “say nothing 
about the specific characteristics” of Robinhood’s security systems or practices.  Id. at 22 (citing 
In re Yahoo!, 2017 WL 327318, at *26).  Finally, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ failure to 
allege any economic losses undermines their statutory standing to pursue a CLRA claim.  Id. at 26. 





































































Plaintiffs contend that their allegations “are more than sufficient to put Robinhood on 
notice of the specific conduct for which relief is sought.”  Dkt. 17 at 27.  Plaintiffs argue that 
“Robinhood makes specific, non-subjective guarantees of the sort courts find actionable when 
broken,” contending that Robinhood’s guarantees are “actionable, non-puffery.”  Id. at 21.  
Plaintiffs point to the statements that Robinhood offers “robust security tools” and that it 
maintains “the highest security standards,” as well as the Financial Privacy Notice which states 
that Robinhood uses “computer safeguards and secured files and buildings.”  Id. at 21 (citing Dkt. 
10 ¶ 14; Dkt. 20-5 Ex. 5).  Further, Plaintiffs contend that Plaintiffs sufficiently allege economic 
loss.  Id. at 29 (citing Dkt. 10 ¶¶ 27-29). 
As stated on the record at the hearing, the Financial Privacy Notice is the only document 
presented by the Parties that may contain actionable, non-puffery statements.  The statements 
Plaintiffs point to in the Privacy Policy and the 6 Commitments stating that Robinhood “take[s] 
privacy and security seriously” and that they are “[d]edicated to maintaining the highest security 
standards” are non-actionable puffery.  “[G]eneralized, vague and unspecified assertions[] 
constitute[] mere puffery upon which a reasonable consumer could not rely.”  Glen Holly Entm’t, 
Inc. v. Tektronix Inc., 343 F.3d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  A reasonable consumer could not rely on these statements as “specific, non-subjective 
guarantee[s].”  In re Yahoo!, 2017 WL 3727318, at *26.  Additionally, while Plaintiffs reference 
the Financial Privacy Notice in their opposition, as stated in Section IV.B.3, there is no reference 
to this document in the FAC.  See Dkt. 17 at 21.  Plaintiffs have not met their burden of pleading 
with particularity the basis of their CLRA claim.  Because this conclusion requires dismissal of 
Plaintiffs’ CLRA claim, the Court need not address Defendants’ argument regarding economic 
losses.  Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ CLRA claim is GRANTED. 
7. Right to Privacy Claim 
“The California Constitution creates a privacy right that protects individuals’ privacy from 
intrusion by private parties.”  In re Google Location History Litigation, 428 F. Supp. 3d 185, 196 
(N.D. Cal. 2019).  To allege a violation of California’s constitutional right to privacy, a plaintiff 
must allege “(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy under 





































































the circumstances; and (3) conduct by the defendant that amounts to a serious invasion of the 
protected privacy interest.”  Low v. LinkedIn Corp., 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
(citing Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 Cal. 4th 1, 35-37, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834, 865 P.2d 
633 (1994)).  The California Supreme Court has explained that “[l]egally recognized privacy 
interests are generally of two classes: (1) interests in precluding the dissemination or misuse of 
sensitive and confidential information (‘informational privacy’); and (2) interests in making 
intimate personal decisions or conducting personal activities without observation, intrusion, or 
interference (‘autonomy privacy’).”  Hill, 7 Cal. 4th at 35, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834, 865 P.2d 633.  
Further, “[a]ctionable invasions of privacy must be sufficiently serious in their nature, scope, and 
actual or potential impact to constitute an egregious breach of the social norms underlying the 
privacy right.”  Id. at 37. 
Defendants contend that unauthorized access to Plaintiffs’ personal and financial 
information is not conduct by Defendants for purposes of California’s constitutional right to 
privacy.  Dkt. 15 at 30-31.  Defendants further argue that even if Plaintiffs could allege that 
Defendants were responsible for the unauthorized access, the unauthorized access does not rise to 
the level of a violation of California’s constitutional right to privacy.  Id.  
The FAC alleges that Defendants’ conduct resulted in a serious invasion of privacy due to 
the release of personal and financial information “including but not limited to names, social 
security numbers, dates of birth, mailing addresses, telephone numbers, bank account numbers, 
details of income, bank account balances, financial transaction histories, credit histories, tax 
information, credit scores, cell phone and mobile computing device location data, IP addresses, 
and Wi-Fi network data.”  Dkt. 10 ¶ 85.  As alleged, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have adequately 
pleaded a claim for invasion of privacy.  The unauthorized access to Plaintiffs’ personal and 
financial information rises to the requisite level of an egregious breach of social norms.  See 
Richmond v. Mission Bank, No. 1:14-cv-0184-JLT, 2015 WL 1637835, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 
2015) (“[I]t is indisputable that the disclosure of details regarding one’s personal finances or other 
financial information is a serious invasion of privacy.”)  (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ invasion of privacy claim is 






































































8. Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) Claim 
The UCL creates a cause of action for business practices that are: (1) unlawful; (2) unfair, 
or (3) fraudulent.  Cal. Bus. & Profs. Code § 17200.  Each “prong” of the UCL provides a separate 
and distinct theory of liability.  Lozano v. AT & T Wireless Servs., Inc., 504 F.3d 718, 731 (9th 
Cir. 2007).  Further, to have standing to pursue this claim, plaintiffs must show that they “lost 
money or property” because of Defendants’ conduct.  Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17204; see In re 
Facebook, Inc., Consumer Privacy User Profile Litig., 402 F. Supp. 3d 767, 804 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
a. Standing 
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have no statutory standing to assert the UCL claims, 
because their alleged losses are not recoverable.  Dkt. 15 at 31.  Additionally, Defendants argue 
that Plaintiffs cannot obtain restitution or injunctive relief.  Id.  To establish standing for a UCL 
claim, “[a] plaintiff must show he personally lost money or property because of his own actual and 
reasonable reliance on the allegedly unlawful business practices.”  In re iPhone Application Litig., 
844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1071 (citing Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.4th 310, 330, 120 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 741, 246 P.3d 877 (2011)).  However, there are “innumerable ways in which economic 
injury from unfair competition may be shown.”  Kwikset Corp., 51 Cal.4th at 323, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 
741, 246 P.3d 877.  For example, “[a] plaintiff may (1) surrender in a transaction more, or acquire 
in a transaction less, than he or she otherwise would have; (2) have a present or future property 
interest diminished; (3) be deprived of money or property to which he or she has a cognizable 
claim; or (4) be required to enter into a transaction, costing money or property, that would 
otherwise have been unnecessary.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
 Plaintiffs alleged that Mehta, Qian, and Furtado have all lost thousands of dollars.  Dkt. 10 
¶¶ 27-29.  Further, Plaintiffs allege that they have also lost control over the use of their identity, 
lost time, and future economic loss.  Id. ¶¶ 21, 27-29, 93.  Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that they 
“made these above-market rate payments that they would not have made, or would have paid less, 
but for Defendants’ representations.”  Id. ¶ 92.  Thus, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a loss of 
money or property as a result of the UCL violation. 





































































 In their opposition, Plaintiffs state that they do not intend to seek restitution under the UCL 
or FAL.  Dkt. 17 at 30 n.2.  Plaintiffs allege that unauthorized user access is an “ongoing 
dilemma” that “will continue into the future.”  Dkt. 10 ¶¶ 19.  Further, Plaintiffs allege that 
“Robinhood has repeatedly neglected to fully inform customers regarding the nature and scope of 
security failures and unauthorized activity.”  Id. ¶ 20.  Plaintiffs face a “real and immediate threat” 
of future injury.  In re Yahoo!, 2017 WL 3727318, at *31 (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 
U.S. 95, 111 (1983)).  Accordingly, at this stage of the litigation, Plaintiffs have adequately 
alleged standing to seek injunctive relief under the UCL.  As Plaintiffs have pleaded their UCL 
claim under all three prongs, the Court will address in turn whether Plaintiffs have sufficiently 
alleged a claim under the UCL.   
b. Unlawful Prong 
“The unlawful prong of the UCL prohibits anything that can properly be called a business 
practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law.”  In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1072 (citing Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal.4th 163, 180, 
83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 548, 973 P.2d 527 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Section 17200 of 
the Business and Professions Code permits injured customers to “borrow” violations of other laws 
and treat them as unfair competition that is independently actionable.  Id.   
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants engaged in unlawful business practices in violation of the 
CCPA, CRA, CLRA, California Constitution right to privacy, and negligence.  Dkt. 17 at 28. The 
Court has already considered the adequacy of Plaintiffs’ allegations as to the CCPA (Section 
IV.B.4), CRA (Section IV.B.5), CLRA (Section IV.B.6), California Constitution right to privacy 
(Section IV.B.7), and negligence (Section IV.B.2).  Accordingly, the Court must DISMISS any 
claims based on violation of CRA and CLRA.  See Sections IV.B.5-IV.B.6.  On the other hand, 
Plaintiffs have stated a UCL claim based on CCPA, California Constitution right to privacy, and 
negligence, which the Court found to be sufficient pleaded.  See Sections IV.B.2, IV.B.4, IV.B.7.  
Thus, Plaintiffs’ UCL claim survives to the extent it is based upon the alleged violations of CCPA, 
California Constitution right to privacy, and negligence, and Defendants’ motion to dismiss is 
DENIED. 





































































c. Unfair Prong 
“The UCL also creates a cause of action for a business practice that is ‘unfair’ even if not 
specifically proscribed by some other law.”  In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d at 
1072 (citing Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1143, 131 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 29, 63 P.3d 937 (2003)).  “The UCL does not define the term ‘unfair.’ In fact, the proper 
definition of ‘unfair’ conduct against consumers ‘is currently in flux’ among California courts.”  
Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc., 891 F.3d 857, 866 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Davis v. HSBC Bank Nev., 
N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1169 (9th Cir. 2012)).  “Before Cel-Tech, courts held that ‘unfair’ conduct 
occurs when that practice ‘offends an established public policy or when the practice is immoral, 
unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers.’”  Davis, 691 F.3d at 
1169 (citing S. Bay Chevrolet v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 72 Cal. App. 4th 861, 85 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 301, 316 (1999)).  The balancing test in S. Bay Chevrolet requires the Court to “weigh the 
utility of the defendant’s conduct against the gravity of the harm to the alleged victim.”  Davis, 
691 F.3d at 1169 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  In Cel-Tech, the California 
Supreme Court established a more concrete definition of “unfair,” defining it as “conduct that 
threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those 
laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise 
significantly threatens or harms competition.”  20 Cal. 4th at 187, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 548, 973 P.2d 
527.  Further, “any finding of unfairness to competitors under section 17200 [must] be tethered to 
some legislatively declared policy or proof of some actual or threatened impact on competition.” 
Id. at 186-87.  While the Cel-Tech test did not apply to actions by consumers, “some courts in 
California have extended the Cel-Tech definition to consumer actions.”  Davis, 691 F.3d at 1170.   
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claim under the unfair prong fails, because Plaintiffs 
cannot adequately allege a violation of California privacy laws.  Dkt. 15 at 31.  Plaintiffs contend 
that Plaintiffs’ claim under the unfair prong is “validly ‘tethered’ to the adequately pled violations 
of the CCPA, CRA, California Constitution, and CLRA.”  Dkt. 17 at 28.  Further, Plaintiffs also 
argue that their allegations are sufficient under the balancing test.  Id. at 28-29.  Specifically, 
Plaintiffs argue that they adequately alleged that Robinhood’s business practices has caused injury 





































































to customers, “far greater than any alleged countervailing benefit.”  Id.  At the motion to dismiss 
stage, the Court cannot say that the benefits from Robinhood’s business practices of allegedly 
emphasizing growth and profit over protecting their customers’ personal and financial information 
and failing to implement industry-standard security measures outweighs the harm.  See In re 
Google Assistant Privacy Litig., 457 F. Supp. 3d at 844; In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1073 (“While the benefits of Apple’s conduct may ultimately outweigh the harm to 
consumers, this is a factual determination that cannot be made at this stage of the proceedings.”). 
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the unfair prong of the UCL is DENIED. 
d. Fraudulent Prong 
“In order to state a cause of action under the fraud prong of the UCL, a plaintiff must show 
that members of the public are likely to be deceived.”  In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1073 (citing Schnall v. Hertz Corp., 78 Cal. App. 4th 1144, 1167, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 439 
(2000)).  “The challenged conduct ‘is judged by the effect it would have on a reasonable 
consumer.’”  Davis, 691 F.3d at 1169 (quoting Puentes v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 160 
Cal. App. 4th 638, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 903, 909 (2008)).  Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading 
requirements apply to UCL claims under this prong.  Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 
1125 (9th Cir. 2009).  Thus, claims under this prong must allege “an account of the time, place, 
and specific content of the false representations as well as the identities of the parties to the 
misrepresentations.”  Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted). 
Defendants make the same arguments for the fraud prong that they make regarding 
Plaintiffs’ CLRA claim.  See Section IV.B.6.  Here, Plaintiffs have not met their burden of 
pleading with particularity the basis of their UCL claim under the fraudulent prong.  As stated in 
Section IV.B.6, the Financial Privacy Notice is the only document presented by the Parties that 
may contain actionable, non-puffery statements, which is not referenced in the FAC.  As alleged in 
the FAC, there are no statements by which a reasonable consumer would be likely to be deceived.  
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the fraudulent prong of the UCL is GRANTED. 
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9. False Advertising Law (“FAL”) Claim 
California's False Advertising Law makes it unlawful for any person to “induce the public 
to enter into any obligation” based on a statement that is “untrue or misleading, and which is 
known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue or misleading.” 
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500.  “Whether an advertisement is ‘misleading’ must be judged by 
the effect it would have on a reasonable consumer.”  Davis, 691 F.3d at 1161-62 (citing Williams, 
552 F.3d at 938).  “A reasonable consumer is the ordinary consumer acting reasonably under the 
circumstances.”  Id. at 1162 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  “In applying this test, 
we are mindful that whether a business practice is deceptive will usually be a question of fact not 
appropriate for decision on a motion to dismiss.”  Id. (citing Williams, 552 F.3d at 938) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
Defendants make similar arguments for the FAL claim that they make regarding Plaintiffs’ 
UCL claim.  See Section IV.B.8.  While Plaintiffs have adequately alleged a “real and immediate 
threat” of injury from Defendants, Plaintiffs have not met their burden of pleading with 
particularity the basis of their FAL claim.  Like Plaintiffs’ CLRA claim (Section IV.B.6) and UCL 
claim under the fraudulent prong (Section IV.B.8.d), the FAC does not reference the Financial 
Privacy Notice.  As alleged in the FAC, there are no statements by which a reasonable consumer 
would have been misled to enter into any obligation.  Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss 
Plaintiffs’ FAL claim is GRANTED. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART 
Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).  Specifically, Defendants’ motion to 
dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for negligence, violations of the CCPA, constitutional right to privacy, 
and unlawful and unfair prongs of the UCL are DENIED.  Defendants’ motion to dismiss 
Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants for breach of contract, violations of CRA, CLRA, fraudulent 
prong of the UCL, and FAL are GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 
Plaintiffs may file an amended complaint by May 20, 2021.  Plaintiffs may not add new 
causes of action or parties without leave of the Court or stipulation of the parties pursuant to 





































































Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Failure to cure the defects identified by this Order will be 
subject to dismissal with prejudice. 
SO ORDERED. 
Dated: May 6, 2021 
 
  
SUSAN VAN KEULEN 
United States Magistrate Judge 
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